This is the fourth volume in the series
Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Science. It contains sixteen lengthy papers, covering four general topics: Clinical Theory, Clinical Studies, Linguistic Studies, and Developmental Studies. The first three papers, in the part devoted to Clinical Theory, are concerned with the philosophy of science as applied to psychoanalysis. The remaining two papers in this section are more content-oriented; the first discusses the theory of narcissism, the second treats the subject of masochistic character development and infantile amnesia.
The chapter by Benjamin Rubinstein on clinical psychoanalytical theory and its role in the inference and confirmation of particular clinical hypotheses is of great interest and importance. It deals cogently with some traditional criticisms directed against psychoanalytical theory by philosophers of science in the tradition of logical positivism and logical empiricism. The best known criticism in this category, is that by Karl Popper. He points out that psychoanalysis is not a scientific theory because it is not refutable-it cannot be disconfirmed. By using "ad hoc" auxiliary hypotheses psychoanalytical theory can turn any disconfirming empirical evidence into a confirming one. According to Rubinstein, underlying this argument are the assumptions that psychoanalysis is a hypothetical deductive theory, with all the axioms logically implying on one another, and that all verifiable inferences are logically deduced from these axioms. Rubinstein points out that the above assumptions are mistaken. First, one has to distinguish between the psychoanalytical theory as postulated by Freud's metapsychology and the clinical theory, consisting of certain hypotheses helping to understand "why" people behave in certain ways. Rubinstein is concerned with clinical psychoanalytical theory and is reluctant to make ontological (metaphysical) commitments regarding the nature of its theoretical concepts. He regards the clinical hypotheses as not necessarily logically implied by one another and as being of a probabilistic rather than a deterministic nature. Therefore, the inferences from these hypotheses are also only probabilistic.
As far as the ontological status of the psychoanalytical clinical theory is concerned, Rubinstein sees two choices, either to assume a Conventionalist point of view a la Pierre Duhem and Henri Poincare, or to commit oneself to a neurophysiological theory compatible with the psychoanalytical clinical theory. The difficulty with this solution is that several neurophysiological theories could be compatible. Almost thirty years ago an attempt was made to equate psychoanalytical theory with a version of Hullian S-R theory (the latter, although a behavioural theory, was closely related to a reflex type neurophysiological theory). This attempt has been abandoned, not because S-R theory was incompatible with the psychoanalytical theory, but because S-R theory has outlived its usefulness in psychology and has itself been discarded for cognitive theory.
The abandoning of the S-R paradigm and its replacement by cognitive information processing theory, in experimental psychology, has also affected psychoanalysis, particularly as far as the latter's metapsychology is concerned.
This change in the theoretical paradigm can be inferred not only from the paper by Rubinstein but also from all the papers presented in the volume. The papers devoted to psycholinguistics use the cognitive theory models extensively. Without doubt cognitive theory, stressing as it does the importance of congruent beliefs and knowledge of the self and the surrounding world, is more compatible with the psychoanalytical therapeutic processes with their stress on the importance of insight, than is the dri ve reduction S-R theory. However, psychoanalysis deals with the interface of the conscious and the unconscious and as such requires more than a cognitive-system theoretical framework. It requires a framework of the self-transcending and self-constituting subject in his relatedness to the world.
It is impossible to deal individually with all the papers in the book, consequently in the remainder of this review I shall only mention some of the highlights of the volume. Emanuel Perfreund in his paper deals with the communication models underlying events during the psychoanalytical hour. He tries to conceptualize the epistemic processes by which the analyst obtains the clinical data from the productions of the analysand. Jerome Neu in his paper, "Thought, Theory and Therapy", compares non-insight and insight psychotherapies. After establishing the superiority of insight therapies over non-insight therapies he compares the insight therapy based on psychoanalytical theory with insight therapies based on psychotherapeutic systems present in primitive cultures. He discusses Levi-Strauss's structuralist formulations. According to Levi-Strauss, both psychoanalytical theory and Shamanistic theory, although using different symbols, refer to the same deep structure of the human mind or of the neurophysiological processes. Neu argues that this is an empirical question, which cannot be answered on an a priori basis, the way in which Levi-Strauss answers it.
Robert Strolow and Adrienne Harrison discuss in their paper the problem of narcissism and frustration-aggression hypothesis. Since the problem of narcissism is closely related to that of the meaning of self and of one's existence, the central dilemma of the human psyche as conceived by psychoanalysis comes very close to that of Existentialist psychiatry. Sidney Blatt, et al. discuss the problem of object representation in schizophrenia. A stable self-identity depends on an ability to perceive and conceptualize steady constant objects. This capacity seems to be impaired and never properly developed in schizophrenic patients.
In the section dealing with linguistic studies, three papers address themselves to the modern psycholinguistic theory as reinterpreted from the psychoanalytical point of view. These papers discuss the language and general semantic phenomena occurring in dreams, altered states of consciousness and in schizophrenia. Colin Martindale in his paper suggests that the linguistic structures revealed in regressed states of consciousness are identical with the deep semantic structure of the basic, subjective lexicon, characteristic of normal states of consciousness. Two papers by Norbert Freedman and Irving Steingert are concerned with kinesic expression and language construction in various pathological states. Three final papers in the volume are concerned with child development.
The book is, on the whole, well written and produced, although the level of sophistication of various papers is uneven. Some papers, particularly those concerned with psycholinguistics, assume a certain level of technical sophistication in the reader. The material in the book could have been better integrated. Overall, the book is worthwhile reading particularly for those who are interested in metatheoretical and philosophical aspects of psychoanalytical theory. The title of this book does not indicate the specificity of the knowledge or clinical approach that is advocated by the authors. This book is about the behavioural approach to interpersonal relationship and, as such, it provides a comprehensive review of social learning theory as well as extensive clinical and research material that shows us one way of understanding human behaviour, and specific behavioural techniques to influence behaviour that is labeled as abnormal or "changeworthy". Early in the book, the authors point out that this book is not just about "abnormal behaviour" but rather it is about all human behaviour. "The behaviours traditionally called abnormal are no different, either quantitatively or qualitatively, in their development and maintenance from other behaviours". All behaviours are learned and learned in the context
